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WORKERS' COMPENSATION FOR DISEASE IN VIRGINIA:
THE EXCEPTION SWALLOWS THE RULE
Elizabeth V. Scott*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last fifteen years, "occupational disease" has become a
household word. Thanks to "Sixty Minutes" and Ralph Nader,
most Americans have been made aware of the hazards of coal dust,
kepone, and vinyl chloride in the workplace. Numerous books have
chronicled the plight of affected workers." A specialty in occupa-
tional medicine is now offered for physicians, who before had little
or no training in recognizing work-related disease. In spite of this
increased awareness, most occupational diseases still go unrecog-
nized, both by physicians and by the legal system.2
Those workers who do receive a diagnosis of a work-related dis-
ease and file for workers' compensation face little or no chance of
obtaining benefits in Virginia. Compensation laws for affected
* B.A., 1977, St. Andrews College; J.D., 1984, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of
Richmond.
1. See, e.g., P. BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AimRCANS (1974); MK CONWAY, RISE GONNA RISE- A
PORTRAIT OF SOUTHERN TEXTILE WORKERS (1979); J. PAGE & M. O'BRJEN, BrrTER WAGES
(1973); J. STELLMAN, WOMEN'S WORK, WOMEN'S HEALTH (1977); J. STELLMAN & S. DAUM,
WORK IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH (1973).
2. In 1972, a Presidential Report on Occupational Safety and Health estimated that
390,000 cases of illness and 100,000 deaths were occurring annually as a result of work place
conditions. See OSHA Injury and Illness Information System: Hearing Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1984) (statement
of Karl Kronebusch, Office of Technology Assessment) [hereinafter cited as OSHA Hear-
ings]. This figure is highly speculative, but no method has yet been devised to accurately
calculate the number of people disabled or killed by work-related diseases. P. BARTH & A.
HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASE 15-27 (1980).
See generally OSHA Hearings, passim.
There are no comprehensive figures for the incidence of work-related disease in Virginia.
Those estimates that are available from the Virginia State Health Department and the In-
dustrial Commission fall far short of this national figure. The Department of Health has
documented between 293 and 357 reported cases of occupational disease each year for the
last several years. Physicians and hospitals report certain occupational illnesses to the De-
partment of Health as patients are seen for treatment. Operating on a calendar year of July
1 to June 30, the Department of Health has documented 321 cases for 1979-80, 325 for 1980-
81, 293 for 1981-82, 311 for 1982-83, and 357 for 1983-84. However, the Virginia State Indus-
trial Commission reported 789 claims for compensation for occupational disease in 1984. See
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA, NATURE OF INJURY REPORT (1984).
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workers have been slow to change and have not kept pace with
medical advances and increased public awareness. Definitions writ-
ten sixty years ago are still used to describe diseases. Many dis-
eases are arbitrarily excluded by this restrictive language. In fact,
Virginia has the dubious distinction of having "the most elaborate
statutory definition" of occupational disease in the United States.3
The definition, contained in section 65.1-46 of the Virginia Code
Annotated, first excludes compensation for all "ordinary diseases
of life" (except those falling within two narrow exceptions), and
then sets out a detailed six-part definition for those diseases that
will be compensated as occupational.4
A recent line of cases interpreting this complicated definition
has construed this statutory language so narrowly that now only a
very few work-caused diseases will be compensable. 5 These cases
culminated in April of 1985 with the Virginia Supreme Court's de-
cision in Western Electric Co. v. Gilliam.6 Gilliam, which reversed
years of Industrial Commission decisions, held that no disease
which is found both inside and outside of the workplace is com-
pensable. Such diseases are explicitly barred by the "ordinary dis-
3. 1B A- LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 41.32, at 7-361 (1985).
4. The Code states:
"Occupational disease" is defined as follows:
Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term "occupational disease" means
a disease arising out of and in the course of the employment. No ordinary disease of
life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall be com-
pensable, except:
(1) When it follows as an incident of occupational disease as defined in this title; or
(2) When it is an infectious or contagious disease contracted in the course of em-
ployment in a hospital or sanitarium or public health laboratory.
A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only if there is apparent
to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances:
(1) A direct causal connection between the conditions under which work is per-
formed and the occupational disease,
(2) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of
the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment,
(3) It can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause,
(4) It does not come from a hazard to which workmen would have been equally
exposed outside of the employment,
(5) It is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the
relation of employer and employee, and
(6) It must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment
and to have flowed from that source as a natural consequence, though it need not
have been foreseen or expected before its contraction.
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
5. See generally commentary on Gilliam in Lazarus, Workers' Disease Rule Altered,
Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 24, 1985, at Al.
6. 229 Va. 245, 329 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
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ease of life" exclusion of section 65.1-46.7
The Virginia General Assembly has passed legislation which, af-
ter July of 1986, will remedy some of the exclusions created by
Gilliam, but other problems with the statute remain.
This article will analyze the current status of Virginia's workers'
compensation law for occupational diseases first by tracing the his-
tory of disease coverage in the state. The Gilliam line of cases will
then be discussed, as well as the remedial legislation passed by the
1986 General Assembly. In conclusion, this article will propose
other changes to make the statute more equitable and better able
to keep pace with the rapid technological advances which create
new diseases and with the medical advances which increase our
ability to diagnose the work-relatedness of these ailments.
H. HISTORY OF DISEASE COVERAGE IN VIRGINIA
A. Diseases as Accidental Injuries
Virginia's first workers' compensation act was passed in 1919
(the "1919 Act"). The 1919 Act compensated only victims of "inju-
ries by accident."8 Occupational diseases were expressly excluded
unless the disease resulted from the accident." Under this rule,
compensation was awarded to an employee who developed sar-
coma, a cancer of the bone, after a fall at work which injured his
ribs10 and to an employee who died of "septic pneumonia" after a
splinter which entered his arm at work became badly infected.11
The 1919 Act also allowed compensation for aggravation of a
pre-existing disease by a compensable workplace injury.1 2 Thus, a
widow of a miner with pre-existing lung problems was awarded
compensation after his death from pneumonia. He had been
7. Id. at 247, 329 S.E.2d at 14.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 1887(2)(d) (1942). This section reads in part: "'Injury' and 'Personal
Injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment and shall not include a disease in any form, except where it results naturally and
unavoidably from the accident." Id.
9. Id.
10. Winchester Milling Corp. v. Sencindiver, 148 Va. 388, 138 S.E. 479 (1927).
11. Bristol Builders Supply Co. v. McReynolds, 157 Va. 468, 162 S.E. 8 (1932).
12. "The general rule... is that causal connection is established when it is shown that
an employee has received a compensable injury which materially aggravates or accelerates a
pre-existing latent disease which becomes the direct and immediate cause of death." Hall's
Bakery v. Kendrick, 176 Va. 346, 350, 11 S.E.2d 582, 583 (1940); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Money, 174 Va. 50, 57, 4 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1939).
1985]
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trapped by falling slate in a mine and suffered a fractured pelvis.
Once he was freed, he was carried down a mountain on a stretcher
in a cold, drizzling rain. He developed pneumonia several days
later and died.13
All other diseases were excluded by the 1919 Act unless they re-
sulted from a single identifiable incident in the workplace. A clear
line was thus drawn between those diseases which were "occupa-
tional" and not compensable and those which could be called "ac-
cidents" for which compensation was available. 14 The Industrial
Commission in Fultz v. Virginia Fireworks Co.'5 said:
An occupational disease is a diseased condition arising gradually
from the character of the work in which the employee is engaged. It
does not occur sudden [sic]. It is a matter of slow development. An
occupational disease is not an accident. An accident ... arises from
some definite event, the date of which can be fixed with certainty
but which cannot be fixed in the case of occupational diseases.'
This distinction was clarified by a number of cases where claim-
ants were poisoned by escaped gas on the job. If the injured worker
inhaled fumes at a particular time on a particular occasion, the
resulting illness was compensable as an "accident.' 7 If, on the
other hand, the illness was the result of inhalation of poisonous
fumes over a long period of time, this was considered an occupa-
tional disease not compensable under the 1919 Act.'8
The arbitrary distinction made in these decisions was criticized
by commentators. One such commentator, discussing Clinchfield
Carbocoal Co. v. Kiser,9 noted:
The court held that a disease caused by inhaling gas which for a
time was escaping from a pipe in the employee's face is not compen-
13. Justice v. Panther Coal Co., 173 Va. 1, 3, 2 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1939).
14. See generally Checkver, A Suggested Analysis for Treating Disease as Personal In-
jury by Accident Under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, 14 VA. L. REv. 358 (1927).
15. Fultz v. Virginia Fireworks Co., 7 0.I.C. 225, 226-27 (1925).
16. Id. (quoting Peru Plow & Wheel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 311 Ill. 216, _, 142 N.E.
546, 548 (1924)).
17. Embrey v. Southern Chem. Co., 13 O.I.C. 87 (1931); Anderson v. Crowell Auto. Co., 9
O.I.C. 156 (1927).
18. Aistrop v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 181 Va. 287, 24 S.E.2d 546 (1943); Turner v. Vir-
ginia Fireworks Co., 149 Va. 371, 141 S.E. 142 (1928); Clinchfield Carbocoal Corp. v. Kiser,
139 Va. 451, 124 S.E. 271 (1924); Fultz, 7 O.I.C. 225.
19. 139 Va. 451, 124 S.E. 271 (1924) (claimant exposed to escaping gas suffered nose
bleeds and developed a severe cold and tuberculosis).
[Vol. 20:161
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sable, but that a disease which results from an accident which
breaks the skin is compensable. That is to say, it makes a great dif-
ference to the employee, as far as compensation is concerned,
whether the germ entered the body through a natural opening or
through a wound or abrasion in the skin caused by an accident. It is
unfortunate that the employee cannot control the entry of an at-
tacking germ. The situation is clearly illogical and unjust. . . .The
fault here, of course, lies primarily with the statute which denies
compensation for occupational disease. 20
The 1919 Act was further criticized by commentators who noted
that there was no theoretical difference between industrial acci-
dents and diseases and further, that "'the border line between in-
dustrial accidents and occupational diseases is so indistinct, both
should receive the same treatment as to indemnity and
prevention. '21
This criticism came at a time when other states were moving to-
wards amending their workers' compensation acts to include occu-
pational diseases. This movement gained momentum in the 1930's
because of a disaster in Gauley Bridge, West Virginia, where hun-
dreds of workers died of silicosis. 22 These cases were not covered
by the workers' compensation act of West Virginia, so the only
remedy available to the decedents' survivors was at common law.23
In 1930, only seventeen states compensated victims of occupational
disease.24 By the early 1940's, this number had risen to about
twenty-five states.
25
B. A definition of "Occupational Disease"
The Virginia General Assembly appointed a committee in 1942
to study the possible coverage of occupational diseases by Vir-
ginia's Act. In its study report, issued in 1943, the committee
agreed with the commentators that such coverage was necessary
20. Pate, Practice Before the Industrial Commission, 29 VA. L. REV. 347, 376-77 (1942).
21. C. HuLVEY & W. WANDEL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND AUTOMOBILE LIALITrY IN-
SURANCE IN VIRGINIA 74, 76 (1931).
22. P. BARTH & A. HUNT, supra note 2, at 6.
23. Jones v. Rinehart & Dennis Co., 113 W. Va. 414, 168 S.E. 482 (1933).
24. C. HULVEY & W. WANDEL, supra note 21, at 74.
25. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES: REPORT OF COMMISSION FOR STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
COVERAGE IN THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, VIRGINIA S. Doc. No. 5, at 5 (1943) [here-
inafter cited as 1943 VIRGINIA SENATE REPORT].
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and that "industry should pay for the damage it causes. 2 6 The
committee recommended that the General Assembly should not
adopt a blanket coverage for all occupational diseases found in
some states, but should instead adopt a list or "schedule" of dis-
eases which would be compensable under the Act.2 7
The 1944 General Assembly did not adopt the committee's rec-
ommendations in full; instead it adopted both a schedule of com-
pensable diseases and a catch-all definition.28 Under the amended
statute, a compensable disease was defined under two criteria: first
it had to be listed in the schedule; and second it had to satisfy the
six-part test for an occupational disease laid out in the blanket
definition now found in section 65.1-46.29
The source of the blanket definition has never been documented,
but it appears to have been taken from similar definitions previ-
ously adopted by Indiana and Illinois.30 These states took their
wording from a 1913 Massachusetts case, In re McNicol3 1 McNicol
involved an accident case in which a worker was beaten to death
by an intoxicated co-worker. The Massachusetts court, in an at-
tempt to determine if this type of accident "arose out of and in the
course of' his employment, set out a series of tests which courts
had used to determine the compensability of accidental injuries.3 2
In 1938, Virginia, by judicial decision, adopted the series of tests
which the McNicol court used to determine whether an accident
"arose out of employment."3 " Virginia still uses the tests today in
accident cases.3 4 There is no legislative history describing the Gen-
eral Assembly's 1944 adoption of the McNicol's "arising out of"
test to describe occupational diseases. We do not know where the
General Assembly looked in its search for a definition of occupa-
26. Id.; see also C. HULvEY & W. WANDEL, supra note 21, at 76.
27. 1943 VIRGINIA SENATE REPORT, supra note 25.
28. 1944 Va. Acts 77; see VA. CODE ANN. § 1887(2)(f) (Cum. Supp. 1946).
29. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
30. See Angerstein, Legal Aspects of Occupational Disease, 18 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 240,
258 (1946); see also Note, Legislation-Indiana Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act, 14
IND. L.J. 542, 547 (1939) (noting that Indiana took its statutory wording from the Illinois
Act).
31. 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913).
32. Id.
33. Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 196 S.E. 684 (1938) (delivery boy killed while
getting a soft drink from the back of his employer's truck while truck was moving).
34. See R & T Invs., Ltd. v. Johns, 228 Va. 249, 321 S.E.2d 287 (1984) (whether assault on
claimant while in a bank on employer's business arose out of employment); Connor v. Bragg,
203 Va. 204, 208-09, 123 S.E.2d 393, 396-97 (1962).
[Vol. 20:161
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tional disease or whether the wisdom of adopting an accident defi-
nition to describe a disease was ever discussed.
The 1944 Act covering occupational diseases remained virtually
unchanged until 1970.35 In 1969, another study committee recom-
mended the abolition of the schedule of occupational diseases,
leaving only section 65.1-46's blanket definition, in order to "insure
the most comprehensive coverage of occupational diseases."3' The
Virginia General Assembly adopted this recommendation and de-
leted the schedule of diseases during its 1970 Session."'
C. Interpretation of Section 65.1-46
After 1970, a disease was compensable if it met the requirements
of section 65.1-46. The Industrial Commission interpreted this sec-
tion to mean that any disease which satisfied the six-part defini-
tion of an "occupational disease" was compensable, and any dis-
ease which did not was an "ordinary disease of life" and was not
compensable unless it fell within the statute's two exceptions.38
The inquiry was not whether the disease was one to which the gen-
eral public could be susceptible outside of work but whether the
occupation put the affected employee at a higher risk of con-
tracting the disease than the general public. 9 Under this analysis,
the Industrial Commission compensated victims of many diseases
which are also seen outside of the employment where proof was
presented that the employment in fact caused the claimant's ill-
ness. 40 They awarded compensation for dermatitis, 41 brucellosis,42
35. Several procedural changes were made to the occupational disease sections of the
Workers' Compensation Act in 1948, and a provision exempting diseases which pre-existed
the Act was deleted. 1948 Va. Acts 243.
The General Assembly amended the blanket definition in 1952 to allow compensation for
an ordinary disease of life which is "an infectious or contagious disease contracted in the
course of employment in a hospital or sanitarium." 1952 Va. Acts 603. This section was
again broadened in 1970 when the General Assembly added "public health laboratories" to
the included employments. 1970 Va. Acts 470.
36. REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, MATTERS PERTINENT TO THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS OF VIRGINIA, VA.
H. Doc. No. 17, at 5-6 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 VIRGINIA HOUSE REPORT].
37. 1970 Va. Acts 470.
38. See cases cited infra notes 41-48.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Coleman v. Central Va. Tel. Co., 60 O.I.C. 103 (1981) (erythematous dermatitis caused
by exposure to fluorescent lighting at work was an occupational disease where exposure to
causative hazard greater at work than at home).
42. Delk v. Smithfield Packing Co., 60 O.I.C. 139 (1981) (disease caused by exposure to
1985] 167
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hearing loss, 43 malignant hypertension,44 chemical hepatitis,45 leu-
kopenia and granulocytopenia,46 Raynaud's syndrome,47 and nu-
merous types of repetitive motion traumas.48
On the other hand, compensation was denied for ordinary dis-
eases of life where the claimant failed to show a causal connection
between the employment and the disease, including coccygodynia
(painful tailbone), 49 various mental problems,50 psoriasis,5' and
Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever.52 The difficult cases for the Indus-
trial Commission after the 1970 amendment were those involving
lung diseases. Allergies,53  asthma, 4  asthmatic bronchitis,5
raw pork sausage at work).
43. Hale v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 59 O.I.C. 112 (1981); Mullins v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 58
O.I.C. 253 (1978); Lee v. Norfolk Gen. Hosp., 57 O.I.C. 226 (1977); Rodahaver v. Allegheny
Airlines, 56 O.I.C. 270 (1975).
44. White v. FMC Corp., 57 O.I.C. 373 (1977) (malignant hypertension and subsequent
death caused by exposure to carbon disulfide at work).
45. Jones v. Polypenco, 61 O.I.C. 244 (1982) (non-viral chemical hepatitis caused by expo-
sure to dimethyl formamide).
46. Lewis v. Crossroads Cleaners & Dyers, 54 O.I.C. 222 (1972) (blood disease caused by
dry cleaning fumes).
47. Hux v. Ukrop's Super Mkt., 53 O.I.C. 150 (1971) (circulatory disorder caused by work
in cold area wrapping meat).
48. Hackler v. Hanes Corp., 60 O.I.C. 176 (1981) (tendinitis is compensable as an occupa-
tional disease); Purge v. White Packing Co., 59 O.I.C. 250 (1980) (carpal tunnel syndrome
caused by pressing down meat being cut into bacon); Sage v. Independence Indus., 53 O.I.C.
322 (1971) (tendonitis from job seaming hose); Robertson v. Westvaco Corp., 53 O.I.C. 309
(1971) (carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease as defined by VA. CODE ANN. §
65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980)); Fragale v. Giant of Va., Inc., 53 O.I.C. 100 (1971) (adhesive cap-
pulitis tendinitis with subacute tendonitis from constant twisting and turning in job as cash-
ier); Moats v. Hengen-Cavalier Constr. Corp., 52 O.I.C. 182 (1970) (effort thrombosis from
heavy work as carpenter); Ferguson v. Dixie Container Corp., 52 O.I.C. 99 (1970) (repeated
occupational trauma to hands).
49. Abbott v. General Elec. Co., 52 O.I.C. 1 (1970).
50. Woods v. United Va. Bank, 58 O.I.C. 363 (1979) (job stress allegedly causing heart
attack is not compensable in absence of medical documentation of effect of stress on claim-
ant's health); Pleasants v. Fairfax County Police Dep't, 58 O.I.C. 289 (1978) (paranoia, anxi-
ety, and depression are ordinary diseases of life and are not compensable where the evidence
fails to show a connection between work and disease); Kaufman v. Star Band Co., 56 O.1C.
190 (1974) (job stress causing duodenal ulcer to recur is not compensable); Fuller v. M & C
Coal Co., 56 O.I.C. 119 (1974) (headaches, nervousness, and anxiety attributed to a noisy
work environment are complaints common to the general public, not peculiar to job).
51. Left v. Owen, 55 O.I.C. 223 (1973) (psoriasis is an ordinary disease of life where physi-
cian falls to causally relate disease to the employment).
52. Rothgeb v. Shoosmith Bros., 59 O.I.C. 269 (1980) (disease is not compensable where
claimant had contact with ticks both at home and on job, and no medical evidence attrib-
uted disease to ticks at work).
53. Long v. Hercules, Inc., 52 O.I.C. 169 (1970).
54. Swiggard v. City of Alexandria, 60 O.I.C. 435 (1981).
55. Esque v. Giant Food, Inc., 56 O.I.C. 104 (1975).
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bronchial asthma,56 bronchitis and emphysema57 were all held to
be ordinary diseases of life where there was no medical evidence
establishing work-causation. Yet, those same diseases were held to
be compensable where evidence showed the claimant to have had
an exposure to some substance in the workplace to which the gen-
eral public was not exposed. "Meat-wrappers' asthma" caused by
exposure to melting plastic fumes, 8 bronchitis caused by chemical
fumes or dust59 or by frequent temperature changes at work,60 and
emphysema of a fire fighter6' were all held compensable as occupa-
tional diseases under the definition of section 65.1-46.
Prior to 1983, compensation in ordinary disease cases was denied
primarily for "failure to meet the burden of proof" of work-causa-
tion.2 The Virginia Supreme Court reviewed several cases of this
type, but the burden of proof under section 65.1-46 was never
discussed. 3
56. Flaneary v. Dominion L-O-F, Inc., 55 O.I.C. 132 (1973).
57. Bailey v. Virginia Limestone Corp., 55 O.I.C. 19 (1973).
58. Smith v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 52 O.I.C. 239 (1970); Good v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 52 O.I.C. 112 (1970).
59. Talley v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 59 O.I.C. 293 (1980) (chemical bronchitis caused by chlo-
ride cleaning fluid at work); Irvine v. Reeves Bros., 55 O.I.C. 194 (1978) (bronchitis caused
by dust or smoke on job); Berberick v. Beacon Press, 54 O.I.C. 11 (1972) (bronchitis caused
by ink and chemical fumes).
60. Jones v. Giant Food, 57 O.I.C. 201 (1977).
61. Williams v. City of Chesapeake/Div. of Fire, 57 O.I.C. 383 (1976).
62. This was the fate of many of the byssinosis cases filed before the Industrial Commis-
sion. See Caskey v. Dan River Mills, 60 O.I.C. 81 (1981). But cf. Adkins v. Dan River, Inc.,
I.C. Claim No. 109-49-31 (Aug. 27, 1985); Barrington v. Dan River Inc., 60 O.I.C. 32 (1981);
James v. Dan River, Inc., I.C. Claim No. 102-72-87 (June 10, 1983); Smith v. Fieldcrest
Mills, I.C. Claim No. 660-914 (March 25, 1983); Thomas v. Dan River Mills, I.C. Claim No.
104-73-01 (Dec. 22, 1982); Williams v. Dan River Mills, I.C. Claim No. 104-57-66 (Aug. 31,
1982); Adkins v. Dan River Mills, 60 O.I.C. 9 (March 21, 1981).
63. Two of these cases involved dual causation problems where the claimant had both a
work-related and a non-work related cause of disability. The court said in these cases that
the Industrial Commission need not find that the employment was the sole cause of the
claimant's disability. So long as the employment was a contributing cause of the disability,
the claimant was entitled to full benefits. See Smith v. Fieldcrest Mills, 224 Va. 24, 294
S.E.2d 801 (1981); Bergmann v. L & W Drywall, 222 Va. 30, 278 S.E.2d 801 (1981). Both of
these cases were remanded to the Industrial Commission for a determination of whether the
employment was, in fact, such a contributing cause. In both cases, the Industrial Commis-
sion on remand found conflict in the medical testimony and ruled that the claimants had
not sustained the burden of proving work-causation. Smith, I.C. Claim No. 660-914; Berg-
mann, I.C. Claim No. 613-870; see also Shelton v. Ennis Business Forms, 1 Va. App. 53, 334
S.E.2d 297 (1985) (remanding a case to the Industrial Commission for analysis under the
Smith/Bergmann rule).
Two other cases, both involving byssinosis, reviewed the Industrial Commission's determi-
nation that the claimant had failed to establish work-causation, again in cases where the
medical testimony was conflicting. The court found the Industrial Commission's decision in
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The Industrial Commission found very few cases where the dis-
ease may have arisen out of and in the course of employment but
was not compensable. Compensation was denied only in the case of
infectious diseases that were contracted in places other than a hos-
pital, sanitarium, or public health laboratory. 4 The employee who
contracted paratyphoid fever after working in flood waters in his
employer's plant 5 and the workers who caught tuberculosis from
co-workers at a printing presse6 were found to be beyond the reach
of the statute, as was the nursing director of a county nursing
home who developed hepatitis.6 7 Because her disease was not con-
tracted in one of the facilities designated by the statute, her "ordi-
nary disease of life" was not compensable.6 8
III. A CHANGE OF INTERPRETATION
A. Ashland Oil and Aggravation of Ordinary Diseases of Life
The Industrial Commission's interpretation of section 65.1-46
began to change in 1983 after the Virginia Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean.e9 In Ashland Oil, the claimant
both cases to be supported by credible evidence and let the decisions stand. The court did
not discuss the applicable burden of proof under § 65.1-46 in either case. Caskey v. Dan
River Mills, 225 Va. 405, 302 S.E.2d 507 (1983); Barrington v. Dan River, Inc., 225 Va. 240,
302 S.E.2d 505 (1983); see Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Robertson, 218 Va. 1051, 243 S.E.2d
234 (1978) (where the supreme court affirmed the award of compensation for "meat-wrap-
per's" asthma, saying that the Industrial Commission's determination that the claimant was
totally disabled from an occupational disease was based on credible evidence).
64. The seminal case for this doctrine was Van Geuder v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 548, 65
S.E.2d 565 (1951). A registered nurse employed by the Medical College of Virginia con-
tracted tuberculosis and was denied compensation under an older version of § 65.1-46 which
compensated victims of infectious diseases only where the diseases were incurred "in the
course of employment in or in immediate connection with a hospital or sanitarium in which
persons suffering from such diseases are cared for and treated." Id. at 551, 65 S.E.2d at 567.
MCV did not normally treat tuberculosis patients, so the court decided her case did not fall
into the narrow category of infectious diseases compensable under the Act. Id.
Cases of infectious disease incurred under the newer version of § 65.1-46 in a hospital,
sanitarium, or public health laboratory have routinely been held compensable. See Singer v.
Commonwealth, 58 O.I.C. 326 (1979) (hepatitis in hospital lab worker); McNeely v. Univer-
sity of Va., 58 O.I.C. 224 (1978) (hepatitis contracted by respiratory therapist in hospital);
Bulifant v. Petersburg Gen. Hosp., 58 O.I.C. 41 (1978) (tuberculosis in hospital receptionist);
Noe v. Hopewell Hosp. Auth., 56 O.I.C. 235 (1974) (hepatitis contracted by nurse); Piland v.
Louise Obici Memorial Hosp., 55 O.I.C. 286 (1973) (tuberculosis in hospital nurse); Bullock
v. Commonwealth, 54 O.I.C. 40 (1972) (infectious hepatitis in hospital employee).
65. Blanks v. Woodward Iron Co., 52 O.I.C. 24 (1970).
66. Brooks v. William Byrd Press Co., 52 O.I.C. 40 (1970).
67. Matchett v. District Bd., 63 O.I.C. 223 (1984).
68. Id. at 225.
69. 225 Va. 1, 300 S.E.2d 739 (1983). For a comprehensive discussion of this case, see
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alleged that a small bunion on her foot had become inflamed as a
result of repeated trauma on her job, which required her to wear
hard shoes and to remain on her feet constantly. She developed
disabling bursitis, a deformed bone, and an inflamed joint in her
foot, requiring an operation to remove both the bunion and part of
a foot bone. The Industrial Commission found that she had a com-
pensable disease aggravated by her employment.7 0 The Virginia
Supreme Court, however, overruled the Industrial Commission and
noted that the small bump on her foot was pre-existing, and
"[t]here is no provision under the occupational disease law of our
Act permitting recovery for aggravation of ordinary diseases of
life.' 71 The court reasoned that section 65.1-45 provides that a dis-
ease only arises out of the employment if its origin was in a risk
connected with the employment.7 2 Thus, any disease, however
slight, the origin of which pre-dates the employment cannot be an
occupational disease but is an ordinary disease of life which is not
compensable. 3
The court, by this reasoning, seemed to sanction the Industrial
Commission's method of distinguishing between "ordinary" and
"occupational" diseases by saying that since the sixth test for an
occupational disease (having its origin in an employment risk) was
not met, the disease must be an ordinary disease of life.74 Indeed,
after Ashland Oil the Industrial Commission continued to differen-
tiate between compensable and non-compensable diseases in this
way. In Wakelyn v. Badische Corp.,5 the claimant, after exposure
to chemical irritants, developed an inflammation of his respiratory
Comment, The Ordinary Disease Exclusion in Virginia's Worker's Compensation Act:
Where is it Going After Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean, 18 U. RiCH. L. REV. 161, 178-83 (1983).
70. Bean v. Ashland Oil Co., I.C. Claim No. 100-79-01 (Jan. 1, 1982).
71. Ashland Oil, 225 Va. at 3, 300 S.E.2d at 740. This is a long standing rule, often ap-
plied by the Industrial Commission as an alternative ground of denying cases where work-
causation of an "ordinary disease of life" was not established. In most of these cases, a
physician was not willing to say the work "caused" the condition but would say it "aggra-
vated" it to the point where it became disabling. There is no compensation under Virginia's
Act for such aggravation. See Terrell v. White Packing Co., 61 O.I.C. 377 (1982) (osteoar-
thritis aggravated by constant standing at work); Hatfield v. Safeway Stores, 60 O.I.C. 192
(1981) (pre-existing arthritis aggravated by cold temperatures and heavy lifting at work);
Pleasants v. Fairfax County Police Dep't, 58 O.I.C. 289 (1978) (pre-existing psychiatric
problems aggravated by work); Kaufman v. Star Band Co., 56 O.I.C. 190 (1974) (duodenal
ulcer aggravated by work); Bailey v. Virginia Limestone Corp., 55 O.I.C. 19 (1973) (bronchi-
tis, emphysema, and asthma that might have been aggravated by work).
72. Ashland Oil, 225 Va. at 3, 300 S.E.2d at 740.
73. Id.
74. See Comment, supra note 69, at 179-80.
75. 63 O.I.C. 359 (1984).
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system which caused a temporary disability. The lung specialist
who examined him performed allergy tests and determined that
the claimant was mildly allergic to a number of substances but had
no history of allergies. He further found that the claimant was
hyper-reactive to an ammonia compound which was present at
work. The Industrial Commission determined, by reference to the
section 65.1-46 test of work-connection, that this exposure to
chemicals in the workplace had caused his lung condition. The In-
dustrial Commission further held that "[w]e do not find that sus-
ceptibility to a disease process, either through genetically based al-
lergic reaction or through direct physical reaction to chemical
irritants, constitutes a pre-existing or on-going disease process,
which brings this case within the ambit of Ashland Oil Co. v.
Bean.
,76
B. Holly Farms and the Exclusion of Back Strains
The next occupational disease case reviewed by the Virginia Su-
preme Court was an abrupt ,departure from the Industrial Com-
mission's traditional analysis. In Holly Farms/Federal Co. v. Yan-
cey,77 the claimant developed a lumbosacral strain at work. Her job
involved constant repetitive twisting, loading racks with packages
of chicken parts. The Industrial Commission awarded her compen-
sation for an occupational disease. The supreme court reversed this
decision.
First, the court stated that a back injury is not an occupational
disease but an injury, and gradually incurred injuries are not com-
pensable in Virginia. For an injury to be compensable, it must oc-
cur "by accident," involving a "sudden, obvious, mechanical or
structural change in her back. '7 8 The court did not discuss the
early Virginia compensation cases which distinguished between an
injury and a disease by whether it developed slowly or as a result
of a definite event."9 Instead, the court cited a 1964 Industrial
Commission decision which held that "[black strain is not a dis-
76. Id. at 363.
77. 228 Va. 337, 321 S.E.2d 298 (1984).
78. Id. at 340, 321 S.E.2d at 300 (citing VEPCO v. Cogbill, 223 Va. 354, 356, 288 S.E.2d
485, 486 (1982)); see also Badische Corp. v. Starks, 221 Va. 910, 914, 275 S.E.2d 605, 607
(1981) (intense pain over a two-day span was not attributable to a specific event on either
day); VEPCO v. Quann, 197 Va. 9, 14, 87 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1955) (the claimant must prove
that the injury by accident arose from an identified incident that occurred at some reasona-
bly definite time).
79. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
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ease" and that a "[s]train of the muscles or tendons in the back is
due to a single or repeated physical trauma which injures the mus-
cles or tendons."80
The court then noted that the Industrial Commission, in its re-
view of Yancey's case, had ignored its 1964 Hensley decision by
finding lumbar strain to be an ordinary disease of life. An ordinary
disease of life, the court held, is not compensable unless it fits into
one of the two exceptions of section 65.1-46. A back strain is
clearly not an infectious disease; therefore, unless it "follows as an
incident of an occupational disease" it is not covered by workers'
compensation."1 The court discussed this exception and found it
inapplicable:
In our opinion, the first exception does not apply because Yan-
cey's back pain did not "follow as an incident of occupational dis-
ease." Yancey contends that this language is ambiguous and that it
could be read in such a way that the back pain need not follow some
other occupational disease but merely follow from the demands of
the occupation. We think Yancey's reading of the statute is con-
trived and unreasonable. In our view, the plain meaning of the lan-
guage set forth above is that before an ordinary disease of life can be
excepted, and thus made compensable, the claimant must first es-
tablish the existence of an "occupational disease" and then establish
that the ordinary disease of life of which she complains followed "as
an incident of" that occupational disease. The six remaining factors
referred to in the last part of Code [section] 65.1-46 have nothing
whatever to do with proving an excepted ordinary disease of life.82
This decision clearly stated that an ordinary disease of life
would not be compensable but left ambiguous how the distinction
should be made between an occupational disease and such an ordi-
nary disease. The court said that the six factors of section 65.1-46
were irrelevant in determining if a disease already determined to
be "ordinary" would be excepted, but did not say that these fac-
tors could not be used to make the initial determination.
The Industrial Commission understood this decision to mean
that its prior method of distinguishing between the two types of
diseases would still stand. Shortly after Holly Farms, the Indus-
80. Hensley v. Morton Frozen Foods Div., 46 O.I.C. 107, 109 (1964).
81. Holly Farms, 228 Va. at 341, 321 S.E.2d at 300.
82. Id. at 342, 321 S.E.2d at 300-01 (emphasis added).
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trial Commission faced a case of repetitive motion trauma. In
Lamberson v. Phillips Automobile, Inc., 3 the claimant developed
carpal tunnel syndrome, a repetitive motion disorder, from the
constant lifting and moving of heavy automobile parts. The Indus-
trial Commission found that carpal tunnel syndrome was not an
ordinary disease of life as was the back strain in Holly Farms but
was an occupational disease "as it had its origin in the employment
and meets the six requirements which are used to determine
whether the disease arose out of employment. 8 4 The Industrial
Commission further noted that carpal tunnel syndrome is a form
of tenosynovitis, which was one of the diseases previously listed in
the original occupational disease schedule and thus has been com-
pensable in Virginia since 1944.85
C. Gilliam and Exclusion of Ordinary Diseases of Life
The Industrial Commission's reading of the Virginia Supreme
Court's definition of ordinary disease in Holly Farms, as demon-
strated by its analysis in Lamberson, was incorrect. In April of
1985, the court clarified its interpretation of section 65.1-46 with
the case of Western Electric Co. v. Gilliam."' The court in Gilliam
considered whether tenosynovitis which had been gradually in-
curred as a result of work-related trauma was, as the Industrial
Commission had decided, a compensable occupational disease. The
court noted that the back strain suffered by the claimant in Holly
Farms had been called an ordinary disease of life by the Industrial
Commission and was not compensable as it did not fall within the
exceptions of section 65.1-46.17 While they "accepted" the Indus-
trial Commission's finding in Gilliam that tenosynovitis was a dis-
ease, they found that it was not "occupational." The court noted
that "[iln terms of cause and effect, we find no legally significant
difference between Yancey's back strain and Gilliam's tenosynovi-
tis.' '88 The court in effect ruled that any disease "to which the gen-
eral public is exposed outside of employment" cannot be an "occu-
pational disease" but is an ordinary disease of life which is not
compensable unless it fits in the statute's two exceptions. Further,
83. 63 O.I.C. 212 (1984).
84. Id. at 214.
85. Id.; see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
86. 229 Va. 245, 329 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
87. Id. at 247, 329 S.E.2d at 14.
88. Id.
[Vol. 20:161
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FOR DISEASE
if, as the court said in Holly Farms, the disease is "ordinary," in
that members of the general public are also susceptible, the six
tests of section 65.1-46 are irrelevant.8 9 The Gilliam court did not
address the Industrial Commission's traditional analysis of occupa-
tional diseases. Instead, it looked first to the six tests of section
65.1-46 to determine if the disease was occupational or ordinary
and then applied the exceptions only if the disease failed to meet
one of those six tests.
Gilliam argued that the legislative intent of the 1970 abolition of
the schedule of occupational diseases was to broaden the scope of
occupational disease coverage, 90 and the General Assembly cer-
tainly did not intend that diseases covered by the old schedule
would be excluded by the revision of the Act. The court mentioned
in a footnote that the claimant made this argument and that the
employer disagreed.9 1 The court itself took no position on the is-
sue, but it noted that a decision whether to compensate gradually
incurred injuries or diseases was a matter of public policy, better
left to the jurisdiction of the General Assembly.2
In 1985, two additional cumulative trauma cases hammered
home the message of Holly Farms and Gilliam. In Kraft Dairy
Group v. Bernardini,93 an employee suffered a chronic muscle
strain loading bundles of ice cream containers onto a pallet. The
court found the muscle strain was a gradually incurred injury
which was not compensable. There was no doubt that the condi-
tion was caused by her work, but under the new interpretation of
the Act developed in Gilliam and Holly Farms, such a work-re-
lated disease was no longer covered by the Workers' Compensation
Act.9  The second case, Lane Co., Inc. v. Saunders, involved a
claimant with a herniated disc which developed gradually from re-
peated bending, twisting, and lifting on the job. The claimant had
no pre-existing back problems and was doing a job different from
her regular one when the pain first developed. The Industrial Com-
mission found this evidence sufficient to establish work-causation,
but the supreme court reversed. Because the claimant could not
89. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
90. See 1969 VmGoiuA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 36, at 6. ("The elimination of the sched-
ule insures the most comprehensive coverage of occupational disease .....
91. Gilliam, 229 Va. at 247 n.2, 329 S.E.2d at 14 n.2.
92. Id. at 248, 329 S.E.2d at 15.
93. 229 Va. 253, 329 S.E.2d 46 (1985).
94. Id.
95. 229 Va. 196, 326 S.E.2d 702 (1985).
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identify a particular injury-causing incident which occurred at a
particular time, she had not suffered a compensable injury by acci-
dent,96 and after Holly Farms she could not argue that her back
problems were an occupational disease.
IV. Gilliam's FALLOUT
A. The Industrial Commission's Response
The most obvious result of Ashland Oil, Holly Farms, and Gil-
liam has been the exclusion of all repetitive motion traumas from
the workers' compensation system. The fact that the evidence es-
tablishes work-causation is irrelevant.9 7 In Davidson v. Kool-Dri,
Inc.," a post-Gilliam case involving tenosynovitis, the full Indus-
trial Commission held with seeming regret that:
The evidence in the case before us clearly shows that the claimant's
tenosynovitis is a disease to which members of the general public
may be exposed under conditions and circumstances which are not
employment related. We find that although the claimant's disease is
not one which is attributed to conditions outside of the employment
... [it still] is one which must under the interpretation of the Su-
preme Court in Gilliam meet one of the two exceptions applicable to
ordinary diseases of life under [section] 65.1-46 of the Act. The
claimant's disease, tenosynovitis, ieets neither of the exceptions in
that it is not an incident of an occupational disease as defined nor is
it an infectious or contagious disease. Therefore, under the law as it
exists today, the claimant's condition is not compensable as an occu-
pational disease under the Act and her claim must fail."9
All of the Industrial Commission's prior decisions finding repeti-
tive motion traumas compensable 00 are now overruled, and since
April of 1985, the Industrial Commission has denied compensation
96. Id. at 200, 326 S.E.2d at 704.
97. See Meade v. Russell County Bd. of Supervisors, I.C. Claim No. 116-26-89 (Aug. 21,
1985) (a synovitis case). Discussing the holding of Gilliam, the Industrial Commission said
that "[a]lthough the evidence in Gilliam clearly showed relationship between the employ-
ment and the disease process, the Court found that Gilliam's disease did not fall within the
statutory exceptions which would allow compensation for an 'ordinary disease of life' under
section 65.1-46." Id. at 3.
98. I.C. Claim No. 116-13-41 (July 10, 1985).
99. Id. at 3.
100. See supra note 48.
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for cases of carpal tunnel syndrome, 101 tendonitis,102 tenosynovi-
tis,103 synovitis, 104 degenerative cervical disc disease,105 arthritis,106
cervical radiculopathy,10 7 epidermoid cyst, 08 bursitis, 0 9 trigger fin-
ger, 1 0 and back strain."' Because these conditions can no longer
be compensated as "diseases," they are only compensable now if
they can be classified as "accidents," occurring as the result of an
injury at a specific, identifiable time." 2
The Industrial Commission has, in at least one case, expressed
dissatisfaction with this interpretation of section 65.1-46. In Meade
v. Russell County Board of Supervisors,"5 the Industrial Commis-
sion noted that prior to Gilliam, it had always interpreted the leg-
islative intent of the 1970 amendments to the occupational disease
law to be a broadening of coverage. Not only were those diseases
formerly covered by the schedule compensable, but also those ad-
101. Morris v. Badger PowhatanfFiggie Int'l, I.C. Claim No. 113-34-76 (Sept. 27, 1985);
Thompson v. Roanoke Fashions/Toltex, I.C. Claim No. 118-12-14 (Aug. 5, 1985); Watson v.
Bassett Furniture Indus., I.C. Claim No. 117-21-94 (July 11, 1985); Estes v. Avtex Fibers,
Inc., I.C. Claim No. 112-78-77 (July 11, 1985); Melton v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., I.C.
Claim No. 116-60-28 (July 9, 1985); Stroop v. Shenandoah Prod., Inc., LC. Claim No. 117-
71-80 (July 9, 1985).
102. Carter v. Hitt Decorating Contracting Co., I.C. Claim No. 118-10-50 (Aug. 22, 1985).
103. Davidson v. Kool-Dri, Inc., I.C. Claim No. 116-13-41 (July 10, 1985).
104. Meade v. Russell County Bd. of Supervisors, LC. Claim No. 116-26-89 (Aug. 21,
1985).
105. Donchatz v. AT&T Consumer Prod., I.C. Claim No. 114-74-00 (June 21, 1985). In
this case, the medical evidence relative to the work causation of the claimant's disc disease
seemed to indicate that work had aggravated a pre-existing condition, which itself is not
compensable under Ashland Oil. Id.
106. Kinowski v. Holly Farms, I.C. Claim No. 118-63-48 (Sept. 27, 1985) (claimant devel-
oped arthritis after eleven years of plucking pin feathers off of chickens); see also Dolberry
v. Mica Co., I.C. Claim No. 114-85-71 (June 20, 1985). In Dolberry, the claimant's job in-
volved constant repetitive use of a foot pedal and flexing her knee. She missed a step leaving
work and injured her knee. The condition was diagnosed as arthritis, which is an ordinary
disease of life. Id.
107. Kronk v. The Frame Gallery, I.C. Claim No. 116-13-86 (June 20, 1985) (job cutting
picture frames caused condition to develop in arm and hand).
108. Washington v. Merillat Indus., I.C. Claim No. 118-29-30 (July 10, 1985) (claimant
developed cyst on hand after repetitive impact of staple gun against palm of hand at work).
109. Menard v. Henrico County Pub. Util., I.C. Claim No. 119-15-91 (Aug. 10, 1985).
110. Hawkins v. Merilatt Indus., Inc., I.C. Claim No. 118-00-24 (Sept. 10, 1985) (claimant
developed trigger finger using power screwdriver at work).
111. Almond v. United Parcel Serv., I.C. Claim No. 118-38-16 (Sept. 24, 1985).
112. Jenkins v. National Serv. Co., I.C. Claim No. 119-28-30 (Sept. 5, 1985). In Jenkins,
the claimant was struck on the wrist by a metal sprinkler and reported the accident immedi-
ately. When she saw the doctor the following week, the doctor diagnosed tenosynovitis and
de Quervain's Syndrome. The commission found the case compensable as an injury by acci-
dent. Id.
113. I.C. Claim No. 116-26-89 (Aug. 21, 1985).
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ditional diseases which met the six requirements of section 65.1-46
were now included. This was the interpretation of the Industrial
Commission, and the expectation of claimants, for fifteen years un-
til the supreme court's decision in Gilliam. The Industrial Com-
mission, in Meade, commented on the effect of the decision:
Hence, after many years of dependence by injured workers upon a
schedule of occupational disease and, thereafter, upon applicability
of section 65.1-46 to certain specific diseases such as tenosynovitis
and tendonitis which commonly result from repetitive trauma in the
workplace, the theory supporting past awards of compensation has
been determined to be beyond statutory authority to enter an
award, despite evidence which may clearly show that a disease pro-
cess has had its origin and development in the workplace.114
Gilliam's effect has not only been felt in the repetitive motion
trauma cases; it has affected other types of disease cases as well.
The first case decided by the full Industrial Commission after Gil-
liam was a hearing loss case, Belcher v. City of Hampton. 15
Belcher was a firefighter exposed to loud noises on a daily basis.
He had previously worked for the railroad and had attended mor-
tar school in the military. The Industrial Commission discussed
the holdings in Gilliam and Holly Farms and concluded:
Applying that standard to this case, it must be fairly said that hear-
ing loss is also an ordinary disease of life suffered by much of the
population for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to
noise exposure both on and off the job, injury or infection, as well as
the aging process. We therefore hold that hearing loss, like tenosyn-
ovitis, is not compensable as an occupational disease.116
Belcher has been affirmed by the Virginia Court of Appeals.1 7
The court first analyzed the evidence presented to the Industrial
Commission and commented that the record was devoid of any evi-
dence that the claimant's hearing loss was a disease. 8 Then, how-
ever, the court seemed to contradict itself when it agreed with the
Industrial Commission's finding that hearing loss, like back strains
114. Id. at 5.
115. I.C. Claim No. 116-13-88 (May 15, 1985), afl'd, No. 0761-85 (Va. App. Jan. 7, 1986).
116. Id. at 4.
117. Belcher, No. 0761-85 (Va. App. Jan. 7, 1986).
118. Id. at 4.
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or tendonitis, is an ordinary disease of life.119 Following the su-
preme court's rationale in Holly Farms and Gilliam, the court then
denied the claim.120
The pre-Gilliam cases awarding compensation for hearing loss 121
are no longer good law, and benefits must be denied even in those
cases where the connection between the employment and the hear-
ing loss is undisputed.122 Gilliam's rationale has also been em-
ployed to deny benefits for hypertension 123  and emotional
disability.1 24
The immediate impact of Gilliam will be a dramatic drop in the
number of disease cases now covered by the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act. Of the 789 occupational disease cases filed in Virginia in
1984, 221 were cumulative trauma cases and 75 were hearing loss
cases. 25 More far-reaching effects will be seen as claims for other
diseases shared with the general population are filed. Such diseases
could include most cancers and respiratory diseases, dermatitis,
heart disease, and the slowly developing effects of toxic chemicals
on the central nervous system, the liver, the kidneys, or any other
internal organ. 126 In fact, the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health has stated that there are probably only eleven
diseases that are uniquely occupational in origin; most others have
"multiple etiologies" and are seen both within and without the
workplace.127
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id. at 6-7.
121. See supra note 43.
122. See Jenkins v. Rocco Enter., I.C. Claim No. 115-99-56 (June 4, 1985). The claimant
in Jenkins was employed in a noisy poultry factory for fourteen years. The Industrial Com-
mission denied benefits saying "it appears the claimant suffers from an ordinary disease of
life and as such would not be compensable even assuming the medical evidence established
such causal connection." Id. at 2.
123. Good v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of State Police, LC. Claim No. 114-19-80, 703-
77 (Sept. 3, 1985).
124. White-Clifton v. City of Norfolk Police Dep't, I.C. Claim No. 118-40-98 (Oct. 2,
1985).
125. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA, NATURE OF INJuRY REPORT (1984).
126. For example, workers in Hopewell, Virginia, who were exposed to kepone in the early
1970's developed tremors, blackouts, chest pains, and blindness from exposure to the chemi-
cal. These are all ordinary diseases of life, occasionally seen in the general population, capa-
ble of being caused by exposure to substances outside of work. Under the Gilliam rule, the
workers who received compensation for these ailments in the 1970's would be ineligible for
benefits today. See generally Lowery, Kepone: A New Way of Life, Richmond News-
Leader, Dec. 22, 1975, at Al.
127. OSHA Hearings, supra note 2, at 23. These eleven diseases include silicotuberculosis
(silica dust), hemangiosarcoma of the liver (vinyl chloride), mesothelioma (asbestos), malig-
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B. The Ordinary Disease of Life Exclusion in Other States
The Virginia Supreme Court, by its strict mechanical reading of
section 65.1-46, has failed to recognize that an "ordinary disease of
life" can become an "occupational disease" when its origin lies in
the conditions of the employment. Virginia's interpretation of the
ordinary disease of life exclusion is unique. Of the seventeen states
expressly excluding such diseases,128 Virginia is the only one to
read its statute in this restrictive manner.
Four of these seventeen states, Florida, Minnesota, North Da-
kota, and South Carolina, have modified the ordinary disease of
life exclusion by statute to make compensable those diseases
caused by some hazard of the employment.129 Florida's wording is
typical, excluding "all ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is exposed, unless the incidence of the disease is substan-
tially higher in the particular trade, occupation, process, or em-
ployment than for the general public."' 30 North Carolina achieves
a similar result from the addition of a single word; it excludes only
those diseases to which the public is equally exposed outside of the
employment.'3 ' The North Carolina Supreme Court has inter-
preted this to mean that an ordinary disease of life is compensable
where the employee has a greater risk of exposure to the disease
than the general public.3 2 "The greater risk in such cases provides
nant neoplasm of the scrotum (mineral oils), extrinsic allergic alveolitis, coal workers' pneu-
moconiosis (coal dust), asbestosis (asbestos), silicosis (silica dust), talcosis (talc dust), and
chronic beryllium disease of the lung (beryllium).
Byssinosis, a lung disease affecting cotton textile workers, is probably not included be-
cause it is clinically almost indistinguishable from chronic bronchitis and other chronic ob-
structive respiratory diseases.
128. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-901.12(c) (Cum. Supp. 1985); Aim STAT. ANN. § 81-
1314(5)(iii) (Repl. Vol. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.151(2) (West 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-
9-280(3), (3)(F)(iv) (1982 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10 (Burns 1974); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-5a01(b) (1981); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 418.401(2)(b) (West 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.011(15) (West Cum. Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.067(1) (Vernon
Cum. Supp. 1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151(3) (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1985);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(7)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-10(4) (Law. Co-
op. 1985); TEx REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35-2-27(28) (Repl. Vol. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980); W. VA. CODE:
§ 23-4-1 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
129. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.151(2) (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011(15) (West
Cum. Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(7)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-
11-10(4) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.151(2) (West 1981).
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1985).
132. Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979) (compensating
a hospital worker who contracted serum hepatitis).
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the nexus between the disease and the employment which makes
them an appropriate subject for workmen's compensation. '" 133
At least eight of these states have reported cases compensating
victims of repetitive motion traumas, either as occupational dis-
eases or as injuries. '3 In one such case, Sanyo Manufacturing Co.
v. Leisure,13 5 the Arkansas Court of Appeals found tenosynovitis
and carpal tunnel syndrome compensable as occupational diseases.
The court held:
As we construe [section] 81-1314(a)(5)(iii) [exclusion of ordinary dis-
eases of life] the fact that the general public may contract the dis-
ease is not controlling. The test of compensability is whether the
nature of employment exposes the worker to a greater risk of that
disease than the risk experienced by the general public or workers in
other employments.3 "
Missouri, a state with an occupational disease statute which mir-
rors Virginia's, has also compensated carpal tunnel syndrome as an
occupational disease where the disease is clearly linked to the em-
ployment. 137 The state's court of appeals outlined the inquiry:
[W]hat is distinctively occupational in a particular employment is
the peculiar risk or hazard which inheres in the work conditions,
133. Id. at , 256 S.E.2d at 200.
134. See Kern v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz., 121 Ariz. 60, 588 P.2d 353 (1979) (holding
synovitis compensable under the Occupational Disease Disability Act); Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v.
Leisure, 12 Ark. App. 267, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984) (tenosynovitis and carpal tunnel syndrome
are occupational diseases); Brown Shoe Co. v. Fooks, 228 Ark. 815, 310 S.W.2d 816 (1958)
(bursitis is an occupational disease); Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So. 2d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (carpal tunnel syndrome and other repeated trauma cases are compensable as
accidents), appeal denied, 388 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1980); Martin v. Cudahy Foods Co., 231
Kan. 397, 646 P.2d 468 (1982) (tenosynovitis is compensable as an accidental injury); Kalee
v. Dewey Prod. Co., 296 Mich. 540, 296 N.W. 826 (1941) (bursitis is an occupational disease);
Collins v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 481 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease); Erving v. Tri-Con Indus., 210 Neb. 339, 314
N.W.2d 253 (1982) (carpal tunnel syndrome compensable as an injury). But cf. Crosby v.
American Stores, 207 Neb. 251, 298 N.W.2d 157 (1980) (carpal tunnel syndrome fits defini-
tion of either injury or occupational disease and is compensable as either); Henry v. A.C.
Lawrence Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 66 S.E.2d 693 (1951) (tenosynovitis is compensable as
an occupational disease).
135. 12 Ark. App. 267, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984).
136. Id. at -, 675 S.W.2d at 844.
137. Collins v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 481 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). For a com-
ment on this case, see Note, Workmen's Compensation-Compensation for Occupational
Disease-Application of the Ordinary-Disease-of-Life Exclusionary Clause of the Missouri
Occupational Disease Statute, 38 Mo. L. REv. 705 (1973).
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and a disease which follows as a natural result of exposure to such
occupational risk, an exposure which is greater or different than af-
fects the public generally, is an occupational disease, not an ordi-
nary disease of life. . . .[W]hether a disease is occupational is not
to be determined by whether the disease is literally peculiar to an
occupation, but whether there is "a recognizable link between the
disease and some distinctive feature of the claimant's job which is
common to all jobs of that sort."1 5
These states have also compensated victims of other diseases com-
mon to the general public, including dermatitis,39 lung disease,14 °
back injury, 141 serum hepatitis, 1 2 cancer, M and gradual hearing
Virginia, as mentioned earlier, 45 probably based the statutory
language of section 65.1-46 on the occupational disease definition
of Illinois 1Us and Indiana.147 These two states, however, have not
interpreted the "ordinary disease of life" language as a complete
bar to compensation. The Illinois Supreme Court, for example,
found dermatitis to be a compensable occupational disease.' 4 The
court reasoned:
[The occupational disease statute] does not place all ordinary dis-
eases of life in a non-compensable status, but only those to which
"the general public is exposed outside of the employment." The
next paragraph, in turn, speaks of a disease which follows "as a re-
sult of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment."
In each instance "exposure" is a predominant factor. We believe it
was the legislative intent that where an employee contracts a dis-
ease, due to exposure to hazards of a peculiar or unusual condition
of work in a greater degree and in a different manner than the pub-
138. Collins, 481 S.W.2d at 552-54 (emphasis in original) (quoting Myers v. Rival Mfg.
Co., 442 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)).
139. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Indust. Comm'n, 33 MI. 2d 268, 211 N.E.2d 276 (1965).
140. Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker, 123 Ind. App. 574, 112 N.E.2d 221 (1953).
141. Carter v. Lakey Foundry Corp., 118 Mich. App. 325, 324 N.W.2d 622 (1982).
142. Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
143. Powell v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 273 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1980).
144. Myers v. State Workmen's Compensation Conm'r, 160 W. Va. 766, 239 S.E.2d 124
(1977).
145. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
146. Illinois has since amended its statute to remove the ordinary disease of life exclusion.
Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.36(d) (Smith-Hurd 1966) with id. ch. 48m, § 172.36(d)
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1985).
147. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10 (Burns 1974).
148. Allis-Chalmers, 33 Ill. 2d at -, 211 N.E.2d at 278.
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lic generally, he is deemed to be suffering from a compensable occu-
pational disease.1 49
Indiana employs a similar analysis in "ordinary disease" cases.
Indiana's Court of Appeals, in Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v.
Hacker,150 recognized that a disease may also be contracted by the
general public "under usual and ordinary circumstances"; still if
the particular claimant's disease did not arise from such usual and
ordinary circumstances but instead was due to hazards of the em-
ployment, his disease is compensable. "The question is not
whether the workman has a disease which is more or less common
to others of the general public, but whether the particular condi-
tions of his work were such as to cause and did cause him to ac-
quire the disease. 15 1
These cases point out how far Virginia has strayed from the rest
of the United States in disease coverage. In all states except Vir-
ginia, the prime determinant of compensability is work-related-
ness. If the disease, be it "ordinary" or "occupational," is caused
by the claimant's work, it will be compensated. In Virginia, how-
ever, this test is no longer relevant. Compensability is instead mea-
sured by whether the disease is also seen in the general population.
This works a grave injustice on many workers who become dis-
abled, can no longer work, yet are ineligible for the benefits they
deserve.
V. RECOMMENDED CHANGES
A. Common Law Remedies and the Exclusivity of the Workers'
Compensation Act
When a Virginia employee receives a compensable injury or ill-
ness arising out of and in the course of his employment, his sole
remedy against the employer is through workers' compensation.
Section 65.1-40 of the Act provides that "[t]he rights and remedies
herein granted to an employee ... to ... accept compensation on
account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all
other rights and remedies of such employee. . . at common law or
otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death. '152
149. Id. at , 211 N.E.2d at 278.
150. 123 Ind. App. 674, 112 N.E.2d 221 (1953).
151. Id. at , 112 N.E.2d at 225 (emphasis in original).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
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This exclusive remedy provision, however, does not apply to in-
juries or death for which no right of recovery is granted. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has interpreted the provision to eliminate the
common law remedies of an employee only for those injuries cov-
ered by the Act. The court stated the rule in Griffith v. Red Raven
Ash Coal Co.:153
Our conclusion is that the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclu-
sive in so far as it covers the field of industrial accidents, but no
further. To the extent that the field is not touched by the statute,
we think that the legislature intended that the employee's common
law remedies against his employer are to be preserved
unimpaired.1 4
This distinction was made in Virginia around 1970, when an em-
ployee working around nerve gases developed chronic bronchitis
and suffered a pneumothorax (a collapsed lung). The Industrial
Commission denied benefits, saying that there was no compensa-
tion available in Virginia for aggravation of bronchitis, an ordinary
disease of life, by the work environment. 155 The claimant then filed
a civil action against the employer. The employer fied a motion to
dismiss, claiming that the employee's sole remedy was the Work-
ers' Compensation Act. The federal district court disagreed and al-
lowed the case to go forward to trial. The court cited the holding in
Griffith and concluded that "[i]n view of the finding of the Indus-
trial Commission that bronchitis is an ordinary disease of life
which is not compensable under the Virginia Workmens' Compen-
sation Act, Perrin's common law remedies are preserved
unimpaired, since this condition is not touched by the statute." ' 6
Similar results have been reached in other states where claimants
have been barred by statute from receiving compensation benefits
for diseases caused or aggravated by the employment.15
153. 179 Va. 790, 20 S.E.2d 530 (1942).
154. Id. at 798, 20 S.E.2d at 534.
155. Perrin v. Brunswick Corp., 333 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Va. 1971); see also Ashland Oil,
225 Va. at 3, 300 S.E.2d at 740 (pre-existing bunion became bursitis and was not compensa-
ble). See generally Comment, supra note 69.
156. Perrin, 333 F. Supp. at 224.
157. See, e.g., Perez v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co., 428 Pa. 225, 237 A.2d 227 (1968).
In Perez, dust and fumes at work caused the aggravation of latent tuberculosis, pre-existing
bronchitis and emphysema. Because these diseases are common to the general population
and are not peculiar to the chocolate industry, they are not covered by the Workers' Com-
pensation Act even though medical evidence established a work connection. The claimant
could have filed a common law action against the employer. Id.; see also Jones v. Rinchart &
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At common law, an employer has a duty to warn an employee of
any health risks known to the employer but not to the employee. 158
The employer also has a duty to protect employee health and
safety.159 A violation of either of these duties could give rise to a
common law right of action if an employee develops a disease as a
result of the employer's negligence.
Do workers now barred by Gilliam from receiving workers' com-
pensation for an "ordinary disease of life" caused or aggravated by
the work environment have such a common law remedy? The issue
has yet to be considered in a Virginia court, but Griffith and Per-
rin seem to indicate that employees do have such a right of action.
In both Griffith and Perrin the employee developed a disability
caused by the work environment but was barred from compensa-
tion by restrictive language in the Workers' Compensation Act.
The field of injuries and illnesses covered by the statute did not
include the work-related complaints of these employees. Hence,
their common law rights against the employer remained intact.
An action at common law has one major benefit to employ-
ees-they are not limited to recovery of the benefit levels set out in
the Workers' Compensation Act. °10 Unfortunately, they face other
barriers in a civil action that are not present in a workers' compen-
sation case. The employee must establish the employer's knowl-
edge of the hazard and his failure to warn of or to correct the dan-
ger. He must also establish his own freedom from contributory
negligence or assumption of the risk. This may prove difficult if the
risk is one known to all employees. Finally, a civil action is also
time-consuming and expensive; benefits could be years away. In
addition, the claimant may be barred by the tort statute of limita-
tions which could, in some cases, be shorter than the limitation for
workers compensation.'"1
Dennis Co., 113 W. Va. 414, 168 S.E. 482 (1933) (where claimant developed silicosis, a non-
compensable disease, through the negligence of his employer, the claimant had a common
law remedy).
158. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Wheeler, 147 Va. 1, 132 S.E. 517 (1926) (employer's
failure to warn new employee of dangers of inhaling fumes from lead-based paint resulted in
the employee's developing lead poisoning which led to optic neuritis and blindness).
159. See Perez, 428 Pa. at _ 237 A.2d at 228.
160. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-54 to -84 (Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1985) (sets out
schedule of benefits).
161. The statute of limitations for "occupational diseases" grants a two-year period "after
a diagnosis of the disease is first communicated to the employee or within five years from
the date of the last injurious exposure in employment, whichever first occurs." VA. CODE
ANN. § 65.1-52(3) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
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B. The Case for Legislative Action
In 1944, a commentator criticized the Virginia Workers' Com-
pensation Act's exclusion of diseases and called the exclusion
"clearly illogical and unjust."1 2 Paraphrasing his criticism, it is
unfortunate that the employee cannot control the type of disease
he contracts from his work because it makes a great difference, as
far as compensation is concerned, whether the disease is one of the
eleven unique qccupational diseases or is an "ordinary disease of
life."
The exclusion of ordinary diseases of life, as the court now inter-
prets it, will produce a plethora of arbitrary distinctions and ineq-
uitable results. To illustrate, a claimant who contracts mesothe-
lioma from asbestos exposure could be compensated, while his co-
worker who contracts a more common type of lung cancer from the
same exposure will not. The cotton textile worker who receives a
diagnosis of byssinosis will receive compensation, but if the same
worker's disease is diagnosed as chronic bronchitis caused by dust
exposure at work, his claim will fail.
A strict analysis of diseases to determine whether they are com-
mon to the general public could further exclude cases from com-
pensation. The above-mentioned cancer called mesothelioma is
also seen in spouses and children of asbestos workers who bring
the fibers home on their clothes.163 Does the worker's disease then
become an ordinary disease of life because people outside of the
work environment are also susceptible? Lead poisoning is found in
children who have chewed paint chips containing lead-based paint.
Does this make the lead smelter employee's lead poisoning an ordi-
nary disease of life? A strict interpretation of Gilliam would say
yes. Mesothelioma and lead poisoning are gradually incurred ill-
nesses, and are "common" to the general public.
The best route out of this dilemma is not to rely on an em-
In a personal injury tort action, "every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of
recovery . .. shall be brought within two years next after the cause of action shall have
accrued." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (Repl. Vol. 1984). The date of "accrual" for a personal
injury action runs from the time at which the tort occurs. This may occur years before the
plaintiff receives a diagnosis of a resulting disease.
162. See Pate, supra note 20, at 377 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Vandike v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., No. 307/S (New-
port News Cir. Ct. filed May 9, 1980). Vandike was a case of "secondary exposure" where a
pipefitter brought asbestos fibers home on his clothes and exposed his wife who developed
mesothelioma. The case was settled and no opinion issued.
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ployee's right to pursue a common law remedy, but to seek a
change in the workers' compensation statute-at least to seek a
return to the interpretation of the Act prior to Gilliam. Workers'
compensation should be a remedy available to any person who has
suffered an injury or illness "arising out of and in the course of
employment." Anything less creates injustice and inconsistency
and ignores the remedial nature of the Act.
Legislation has just passed the Virginia General Assembly which
would, in part, return the Act to a pre-Gilliam status. House Bill
466, introduced in January of 1986, provides:
§ 65.1-46. "Occupational disease" defined.-As used in this Act,
unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term "occupa-
tional disease" means a disease arising out of and in the course of
the employment, but not an ordinary disease of life to which the
general public is exposed outside of the employment.
A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only if
there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the
circumstances:
(1) A direct causal connection between the conditions under
which work is performed and the occupational disease,
(2) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the
work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the
employment,
(3) It can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate
cause,
(4) It is neither a disease to which an employee may have had
substantial exposure outside of the employment, nor any condition
of the neck, back or spinal column,
(5) It is incidental to the character of the business and not inde-
pendent of the relation of employer and employee, and
(6) It had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and
flowed from that source as a natural consequence, though it need
not have been foreseen or expected before its contraction.
§ 65.1-46.1. "Ordinary disease of life" coverage.-An ordinary
disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the
employment may be treated as an occupational disease for pur-
poses of this Act if it is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence, to a reasonable medical certainty, that it arose out of and in
the course of employment as provided in § 65.1-46 with respect to
occupational diseases and did not result from causes outside of the
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employment, and that:
1. It follows as an incident of occupational disease as defined in
this title;
2. It is an infectious or contagious disease contracted in the
course of one's employment in a hospital or sanitarium or public
health laboratory or nursing home as defined in § 32.1-123 (2) of
this Code, or in the course of employment as emergency rescue per-
sonnel and those volunteer emergency rescue personnel as are re-
ferred to in § 65.1-4.1 of this Code; or
3. It is characteristic of the employment and was caused by con-
ditions peculiar to such employment.'"
The bill restores compensation to most employment-caused dis-
eases, except for conditions of the neck, back and spinal column.165
The bill retains the Virginia Supreme Court's distinction between
"occupational" and "ordinary" diseases, but such "ordinary" dis-
eases may now be compensated if an affected employee can estab-
lish work-causation. The burden of proof for the employee, how-
ever, will be much more difficult than it was before Gilliam. The
employee afflicted by an "ordinary" disease must prove causation
by clear and convincing evidence and establish that the disease did
not result from a non-work cause. 6 Finally, language granting
compensation for infectious diseases has been broadened and now
includes diseases contracted by volunteer rescue personnel in the
course of their employment.16 7
Even though the bill has passed the 1986 General Assembly a
question remains about those claims that arise between April of
1985, when Gilliam was decided, and the enactment of the reme-
164. House Bill 466, 1986 HousE JOURNAL - (emphasis in original). As of this writing,
the bill has passed the House of Delegates by a vote of 85 to 8. Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Feb. 9, 1986, at A-10.
165. An amendment was introduced in the House Labor and Commerce Committee to
exclude all injuries of the muscular, ligamentous, and skeletal systems. This restrictive
amendment, which would in effect have endorsed the supreme court's ruling in Gilliam, was
narrowly defeated by a vote of 11 to 9. 1986 HOUSE JOURNAL
166. This language may mean that if any part of the disease arose outside of the employ-
ment, compensation will be denied. Testimony of Lawrence Pascal before a joint House-
Senate Subcommittee on the Gilliam case, January 22, 1986. This could well create another
dichotomy between "ordinary" and "occupational" diseases, since there is no requirement
that "occupational" diseases be caused solely by the employment. Smith v. Fieldcrest Mills,
224 Va. 24, 294 S.E.2d 801 (1981); Bergmann v. L. & W. Drywall, 222 Va. 30, 278 S.E.2d 801
(1981).
167. House Bill 466, 1986 HousE JOURNAL
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dial legislation in July of 1986. Any disease which is not diagnosed
until after the statute goes into effect will be covered by the new
law""' but those diagnosed in the intervening period will fall be-
tween the cracks unless the General Assembly expressly makes any
such amendment retroactive to April of 1985.119
C. A Look to the Future
This change in the statute will remedy the most immediate
problem with disease compensation. The majority of workers suf-
fering from occupation-caused diseases will again be entitled to
compensation benefits. However, many problems still exist with
section 65.1-46 and its six-part definition of an occupational dis-
ease. It is archaic, drawn from a 1913 Massachusetts case,170 and it
does not reflect any of the advancements in law or medicine since
that time. Many of the chemicals now in use, and the diseases they
can cause, were unknown in 1913. Furthermore, the definition was
never intended by the Massachusetts court to describe a disease; it
was descriptive of an injury whose connection to the employment
was in doubt.17 1
A careful reading of section 65.1-46's six elements shows that the
section is repetitious, and some sections are virtually meaningless.
A similar section was strongly criticized by the Indiana Court of
Appeals, 172 which noted: "The act is poorly drafted .... Its
sentences are grammatically intolerable and its sections are inordi-
nately long, all resulting in confusions and contradictions ....
The statute's high purpose deserves a better mold than that in
which it has been cast. 1 7 3
Further, the last of the six requirements-that the disease have
168. Adkins v. Dan River, Inc., I.C. Claim No. 109-49-31 (1985); Parris v. Appalachian
Power Co., I.C. Claim No. 637-202 (1985); Gowen v. C.E. Thurston & Sons, 63 O.I.C. 144
(1984); Crenshaw v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock, 57 O.I.C. 83 (1977). VA. CODE
ANN. § 65.1-49 (Repl. Vol. 1980) provides that the first communication of an occupational
disease is deemed to be the date of "accident." On that date, all rights and liabilities attach,
and the law in effect on that date controls the case.
169. See Buenson Div. Aeronca, Inc. v. McCauley, 221 Va. 430, 270 S.E.2d 734 (1980);
Allen v. Mottley Constr. Co., 160 Va. 875, 170 S.E. 412 (1933).
170. See In re McNichol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913); see also supra notes 31-34
and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
172. Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker, 123 Ind. App. 674, -, 112 N.E.2d 221, 225
(1953) (quoting SmALL, WORmEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA § 13.1, at 421-22 (1951)).
173. Id. at _, 112 N.E.2d at 225.
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its origin in an employment risk-excludes all aggravation of dis-
eases by the work environment.17 4 This produces yet another ineq-
uitable distinction. Under other sections of the Act, aggravation of
a pre-existing disease is compensable if the aggravation or acceler-
ation was a result of an industrial accident.17 5 For instance, if the
claimant in Ashland Oil' 78 had dropped a heavy wrench on her
foot, aggravating a pre-existing "small bump" and causing the en-
suing disease and disability, she could have been compensated.
Unfortunately, the aggravation was gradually caused by repeated
trauma, so her work-caused disability was beyond the scope of the
Act.
The General Assembly needs to take a long, hard look at section
65.1-46. The section's six criteria should be individually analyzed.
The definitions of other states' workers' compensation acts should
be surveyed.17 7 The definition of "occupational disease" should be
concise and clear enough to make the burden of proof understand-
able to both claimants and employers. It should also clearly ex-
clude any disease for which a work connection is not established.
Such a change cannot happen in the next General Assembly ses-
sion; it will require study and input from a large number of
sources. However, such a change will be necessary to complete the
job of correcting the inequities of the Act. W.L. Robinson, a long-
time employee of the Industrial Commission, said in 1935 that
"[t]he principle of social justice and right which underlies and
which, in fact, is the foundation of workmen's compensation is that
industry should bear the burden of its accidents. 11 8 This state-
ment is no less true today. The cost of wcrk-related disease is a
cost of doing business. It should be the burden of industry, not the
burden of the taxpayer, to pay for the damage done to the health
of its workforce.
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46(6) (Repl. Vol. 1980).
175. Ohio Valley Constr. Co. v. Jackson, 230 Va. 56, 58, 334 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1985); Lilly
v. Shenandoah Pride Dairy, 218 Va. 481, 488, 237 S.E.2d 786, 791 (1977); Rogers v. Wil-
liams, 196 Va. 39, 42, 82S.E.2d 601, 602-03 (1954); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Money, 174 Va.
50, 55, 4 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1939).
176. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
177. Currently, only four other states (Indiana, Missouri, Utah, and West Virginia) have a
definition of occupational disease with the same provisions as Virginia which exclude ordi-
nary diseases of life and require a six-part inquiry into whether a disease arose out of and in
the course of employment. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
178. D. RATCLIFF, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE HANDBOOK 2-3 (1952).
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